SOME SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE DILEMMA
DAvID MECHANIC *

Current medical malpractice problems are symptomatic of deeper
issues in the practice of medicine, in our system of social insurance,
and in the fabric of our society. The noisy manifestations of the malpractice debate-complaints about staggering increases in the insurance premiums physicians pay in certain vulnerable specialties1 or
about contingent fees of attorneys 2 -are perhaps some of the least
important aspects. As is true of many other problems, the symptoms
are more easily treated than the basic malady, but symptomatic treatment at best buys time to examine, to reflect, and to consider more
basic long-term approaches.
A great deal has been written about malpractice, but pertinent
data to answer many obvious questions are not readily available. Thus,
it becomes difficult to distinguish the speculative but plausible hypothesis from the true state of affairs. This Article can do little to
remedy this basic shortcoming, since I have no new data to clarify
issues where they have become obfuscated. My objectives, however,
are to define the basic issues underlying the malpractice dilemma, to
clarify some common concepts that are amenable to research, and to
suggest certain hypotheses that deserve examination.
Medical malpractice litigation is said to perform two important
functions: (1) to deter physicians from lax, careless, or negligent
behavior;8 and (2) to compensate patients injured as a consequence
of the negligence of the hospital, physician, or ancillary health care
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personnel.4 As to the first function, it is assumed that the threat of
possible malpractice litigation encourages prudent behavior beyond
that which is learned in the training of the health professional. Particularly in the case of the hospital, such a threat is believed to result
in greater attention to risks with low probability (such as those due
to inadequate safety precautions, the unavailability of specialized
equipment which is needed infrequently, or inadequate supervision of
personnel). It is not clear what proportion of malpractice claims or
dollars awarded is related to such problems, 5 but it is assumed that
since hospitals are rated by risk, there is an incentive operating to
avoid malpractice claims. 6
Although physicians are not usually rated by risk beyond the
nature of their specialized fields, it is assumed that the stigma
associated with a malpractice judgment is a significant deterrent to
carelessness. It is not obvious, however, that physicians perceive malpractice claims as stigmatizing, and it appears that some feel merely
harassed and persecuted by the claims. Some very fragmentary and
inadequate data suggest that physicians may have sympathy for a
colleague who is sued, and may refer patients to such a colleague to
ensure that he does not suffer financially from malpractice litigation.7
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of having a malpractice claim
made against a physician is the anxiety, lost time, and uncertainty
that may be involved. Even when such claims are rejected, and
physicians vindicated, being sued is an unpleasant and disruptive
experience. Thus, the costs to the physician must be weighed not only
in terms of the awards actually made, but in terms of the total costs
of becoming entangled in such an incident. A claim made against a
conscientious physician may cause him considerable suffering and may
distract him from his best efforts.
The second generally accepted function of the malpractice mechanism is to compensate persons who suffer injury as a result of errors
in treatment. But medical malpractice suits are at best a capricious
and inequitable means of compensation. While some claimants obtain
very large awards, others suffering from equally serious injuries
receive no compensation at all. If our social insurance system were
more satisfactory, and provided ample compensation for necessary
4. Brooke, Medical Malpractice: A Socio-Economic Problem From a Doctor's
View, 6 WmLLAMETE L.. 225, 226 (1970).
5. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 5-12.
6. Id. at 41-42.
7. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SocIAL PROB. 133,
138-39 (1962).
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medical costs and for disability resulting in dependence, the malpractice issue would be a less important concern for us. Although there
would still be a need to deal with compensation for pain and suffering resulting from negligence, this is probably the aspect of malpractice having the least social significance. Because we do not have an
adequate system of health care insurance, and because assistance for
the disabled and dependent is modest, the manner in which the medical malpractice mechanism compensates victims of negligence looms
more significant.
Hypotheses Concerningthe Growth of Medical MalpracticeLitigation

In recent decades medical science and technology have experienced dramatic growth, accompanied by increasing specialization and
subspecialization of medical care and a larger and more heterogeneous
mix of health care manpower." Public expectations concerning the
performance of the medical sector have also grown, stimulated by the
mass media's treatment of impressive developments in medical technology and knowledge. All of these changes-as I shall attempt to
illustrate-contribute both to the probability that errors will occur
and to the probability that patients, becoming cognizant of errors, will
make claims against physicians.
Increasingly, physicians have available a more powerful technology for evaluating and treating disease, but a technology that also
can cause havoc when incorrectly applied. The traditional practitioner, with his little black bag, was able to affect disease in only a
modest way, but his possibilities of doing harm were also more limited
than at present. Given the complex technology that physicians now
command, human error having important adverse consequences is
inevitable even when physicians are fully qualified, careful, and prudent. More important is the fact that, unlike the errors of his predecessors, the errors of a modern physician have great capability for
harm. Even a small lapse in judgment or attention in the application
of a complex and risky treatment or diagnostic procedure may have
major consequences for the patient in terms of pain experienced or
resultant disability. While we all might agree that in the use of highrisk procedures (such as heart catheterization or particular types of
biopsies) a certain probability of aderse events is to be expected, the
physician has no assurance that a malpractice claim will not be made
8. See generally H. GREENFmLD,
PROsPECTS (1969).
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against him when such adverse consequences occur, nor that a finding
of fault will not result.
The uncertainty experienced by the physician results, in part,
from the ambiguity of medical standards and the unknown criteria
for a finding of malpractice. The occurrence of adverse events varies
a great deal among physicians and hospitals, and depends both on the
quality of the professionals and on the types of cases involved; it has
been demonstrated repeatedly that teaching hospitals in general provide higher quality care than proprietary hospitals. 9 The fact that
variations in performance exist does not imply that those with poorer
performance are guilty of malpractice; yet it remains unclear what
standard of medical practice will be perceived by judge or jury as
below the acceptable minimum. The determination is arrived at
through the process of an adversary proceeding in which claimant and
defendant marshal various evidence to sustain their positions. Given
the nature of this process, it is quite possible that adverse effects,
which may be reasonably anticipated in at least some cases where
complex diseases are treated with dangerous medical techniques, may
be seen by juries as instances of malpractice.
The problem is made especially difficult in that the existence of
a given probability of adverse events does not mean that when such
events occur they are not a result of errors. For example, we can predict quite reliably the approximate deaths and injuries due to automobile accidents in the coming month. We know, given our system
of highways, the construction of automobiles, human error in driving,
variable weather conditions, and the like, that in the aggregate a certain rate of accidents is inevitable. This does not mean that in any
particular accident we cannot specify that the proximate cause of the
injury was the error of one of the parties involved. Similarly, while
statistically it may be inevitable that a gastroenterologist, in inserting
gastroscopes in thousands of patients' stomachs, will pierce the wall
of an individual's stomach, in any instance in which the stomach is
injured it may be due to momentary negligence or an error of judgment on the part of the physician. While we recognize that there are
errors in all human activities, and thus it is unjust to stigmatize the
physician in such cases, it still may be fair to compensate the injured
patient.
An element in the apparent increase in malpractice awards is the
unwillingness of hospitals, physicians, and insurers to contest small
9. Goss, Organizational Goals and Quality of Medical Care: Evidence from
ComparativeResearch on Hospitals, 11 1. HALT- & SocIAL BEHAvIoR 255 (1970).
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claims, even when their merits are dubious, because of the costs of
prolonged litigation.' 0 There is a tendency to agree to small settlements to avoid the harassments of litigation. It has been alleged that
awareness of this among lawyers encourages litigation that would not
have been pursued had defensive efforts been more persistent. In
conjunction with certain other incentives for litigation, including the
contingent fee -and the absence of a requirement to pay costs in an
unsuccessful suit, it is not surprising that malpractice litigation occurs
more commonly in the United States than in other countries where
these incentives do not exist."
Depending on one's perspective,
however, the American system may be thought superior in providing
poor litigants a fair opportunity to seek redress under circumstances
in which they feel they have been injured. The inhibition of such litigation in many countries may reflect too strong a bias in favor of the
authority of the medical profession.
The emerging medical organization that has accompanied growing
medical knowledge and technology has also probably contributed to
increased litigation. As a larger number of people are involved in a
patient's care, the risks of errors in communication and follow-up
treatment are very much increased. Similarly, the fragmentation of
care leads to an erosion of the relationships between doctors and
patients and of the quality of communication and trust.' 2 Thus,
misunderstandings between doctor and patient are more likely to
occur, and patients are less likely to develop loyalty and commitment
to a physician. When things go wrong they are more likely to feel
that he is blameworthy, and are more likely to consider litigation.
Evidence for this point of view is at best fragmentary. One study
in California found that patients who sued doctors reported that the
doctors had been unresponsive and had insisted on large payments
despite adverse results.' 3 Some additional support comes from a
study of consumer attitudes conducted by the Temple University
Institute of Survey Research.' 4 In this national study involving
10. See Sagall, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right?, 10 TRIAL 59
(July/Aug. 1974). But see Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 590, 596 (1973).
11. See Addison & Baylis, The Malpractice Problem in Great Britain, in MEDICAL.
MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 854; Welsh, Medical Malpractice in Canada, in
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 849.
12. See generally D. MECHANIC, Tm GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE (1976).
13. R. BLuM, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DOCToR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (1960); R.
BLUm, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MALPRACTICE Surrs (1957).

14. Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward Medical Malpractice,
in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 658.
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1,017 interviews, the surveyors found that while respondents had
favorable attitudes toward the technical competence of physicians,
most people felt that relationships with doctors had deteriorated over
the last twenty years. 15 A subgroup of respondents reported that
either they or members of their families had suffered a negative medical care experience. Persons reporting such negative experiences
were more likely to report also that today's doctors maintained poor
doctor-patient relationships. 1" Major reasons given for the view that
physicians have become less dedicated were that they are too interested in money, that they are less accommodating and more difficult
to reach, and that they are more impersonal or inconsiderate." Although it is impossible to infer causal relationships from correlational
findings, these data are at least consistent with the hypothesis that
deteriorating and impersonal doctor-patient relationships contribute
to the malpractice problem.
Still another factor in the rise of litigation is the changing
character of both the medical and legal communities. Until relatively
recently it was difficult to litigate a malpractice case successfully
because of the unavailability of medical testimony.' 8 Increasingly,
American medicine has become more fragmented, and medical testimony is more accessible to patients and their attorneys.' 9 Physicians
now more commonly concede that they have a responsibility to testify
for a patient who they believe has been wronged. Similarly, it
appears that lawyers are more willing to accept malpractice work, and
firms have emerged that specialize in this area. 20 It has been alleged
that receptivity among lawyers to malpractice litigation increased following the implementation of no-fault automobile insurance. Any
serious test of that allegation would require a comparison of data
obtained over time from states with and without no-fault automobile
insurance. It seems more likely that growing litigation in the medical
area is a result of a variety of factors, including the increased availability of medical testimony. Lawyers tend not to accept malpractice work
unless medical corroboration is available. 2 ' Finally, all of these
15. Id.

16. Id. at 678.
17. Id. at 668.
18. 3 A. AUBRBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES 9-10 (1960); M.
Docrons 520 (1966).
19. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 36-37.
20. See, e.g., Waxman, A Health Care Slide, 11 TRIAL 24 (May/June
generally Frankel, Medico-Legal Communications, 6 WmILAMETrE L.J. 193,
21. Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System,
MALPRACrIcE REPORT Appendix 99.
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changes are concurrent with growing sophistication among consumers,
increasing acceptance of consumer rights, and greater accessibility to
legal services.
There is little question that the growth of medical technology and
its dramatic achievements have done a great deal to increase popular
expectations of the possibilities of medical treatment. People often
expect miracles, but they are less tolerant of the dangers associated
with the use of new techniques. Evidence from other areas of medical
care research suggests that when patients have unrealistic expectations about their medical treatment, they feel more angry and dissatisfied with their care and pose more difficult problems of medical
management and social adjustment. 22 It seems reasonable to extrapolate from such studies the principle that public expectations-to the
extent they are unrealistic-contribute to growing disappointment in
experience and to greater expressions of dissatisfaction, thus contributing to malpractice litigation.
Perhaps most basic-but also more vague-is a growing sense of
distrust in contemporary American society. Trust is the glue that
cements human relationships, that allows us to proceed-though
inadequately informed-with some confidence that the claims made
by others are reliable. We live in a period in which all claims are
increasingly scrutinized, and it is more common to see the motives and
sincerity of people challenged. With the increasing complexity of
technology and social organization, there is an enormous proliferation
of rules, regulations, and contracts that help to define rights and obligations. Yet even in the most bureaucratic context, written rules are
but a small fraction of the necessary understandings required to carry
out activities. Flexibility and discretion are necessary for effective
performance, and these must depend to some extent on trust. As
trust becomes more unstable, efforts are made to formulate more and
more rules to govern behavior, but the proliferation of rules, and the
difficulty of writing them in a way that will achieve the desired ends,
result in inefficiencies and tendencies toward manipulation. In short,
when the level of distrust becomes too high, social institutions are
threatened, and an attempt to impose further rules and regulations
will prove an inadequate remedy.
It is difficult to assess to what extent current malpractice difficulties reflect growing distrust of physicians. Certainly, available evi22. See I. JANIs, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRISS (1958).

See also Egbert, Battit, Welch, et

aL, Reduction of PostoperativePain by Encouragement and Instruction of Patients, 270
NEw ENo. J. MED. 825 (1964).
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dence continues to support the assertion that physicians are highly
regarded by the public and continue to occupy a privileged status
among American occupations.23 But the medical profession in recent
years has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms, both from outside
and from within, that has contributed to some loss of trust and confidence. With unfavorable mortality and morbidity statistics, misuse
of human subjects in experimentation, dominance and control in the
profession's self-interest, and profiteering and chicanery on the part
of a few physicians in public programs, the public has been given considerable basis for insecurity. And this has occurred at the same time
that the public has become, in some sense, more dependent on medical
care for general social sustenance due to the erosion of other social
institutions such as the church, the kinship group, the neighborhood,
and the family. The public seems to share a strange ambivalence
about medical care-characterized by high and often unreasonable
expectations, a strong sense of dependency, and a critical attitude. It
is precisely when people expect too much that they are most likely
to suffer bitter disappointment.
None of the foregoing should be taken to mean that medicineand the way it is practiced-has made no contribution to the growing
sense of dissatisfaction. Certainly there have been abuses, and the
thrust of medical organization has not been toward the preservation
of close doctor-patient relationships, educational dialogues between
practitioners and patients, or the humanization of medical services.
While physicians are often kind and helpful, their priority has been
the absorption of new technologies and their efficient application, and
not medical practice as a broader social endeavor. But even if their
priorities had been different, it is not clear that the problems we now
face could have been avoided. The malpractice crisis, in part, reflects
the larger society of which it is a part, and it may be that there is
only a limited amount that physicians can do to alleviate it.
The Epidemiology of Medical MalpracticeLitigation
Although it is difficult to locate current data on the occurrence
of malpractice claims, the estimates from the Secretary's Commission
on Medical Malpractice will serve our purposes. Patients tend to be
naive about the possibilities and dangers of medical treatment, and
lack any clear standard by which to decide whether the physician behaved negligently. Thus patients may use a variety of standards such
23. A. REIss,

JR., OccuPAnoNs AND SOCIAL STATUS

(1961).
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as bad outcome, apparent irregularities in the physician's behavior, or
advice of friends or relatives as clues to the possibility that they have
suffered a wrong. Desire to take some action against a physician may
result as much from superficial clues, which the patient associates
with a bad outcome, as from any objective medical circumstance. Or,
conceivably, the motivation for a complaint may result as much from
a desire for retribution for what the patient feels is callous and
inhumane behavior on the part of the physician as from any seriously
negative outcome. We know too little about how medical encounters
that are eventually litigated compare with ordinary medical encounters.
Once a patient has come to believe that negligent behavior has
occurred, he is likely to make inquiries, discussing his experiences with
relatives and friends. If he is to make a claim he must find a lawyer
willing to pursue the case, and this too will depend on whether he
finds an appropriate legal pathway. He may be discouraged by his
initial contact with a lawyer who is uninterested in such a case or
views the grievance as either inappropriate or unprofitable to pursue.
The ability to make successful contact with a suitable lawyer probably
depends both on the patients sophistication and social network and
on the characteristics of the bar in the region in which he lives.
On the basis of data from twenty-six of the largest malpractice
insurance carriers, the staff of the Commission on Medical Malpractice
estimated that a malpractice incident was reported or alleged by
physician or patient for one of every 158,000 patient visits.24 A claim
was made for one of every 226,000 visits.25 Only one in ten claims
ever reached trial, and one half of the payments made in response to
claims in 1970 were for less than $2,000.26 Although the dollar
amounts have escalated somewhat in the past few years, the basic
point still holds true that the vast majority of awards are relatively
small.
A contentious issue is whether too many malpractice suits are
being filed. Many physicians feel that litigation is often mischievous
and unduly encouraged by a variety of incentives that are not present
in other countries.2 7 Among the procedures often discouraged else24. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 12. See also Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, Medical
MalpracticeInsurance Claims Files Closed in 1970, in MBDIc.L MALPRAcTIcE REPORT
Appendix 1.

25. MEDIcAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 12.
26. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 24, at Appendix 21.
27. See N.Y. Times, June 2, 1975, at 53, col. 4; J.O'CoNELL, supra note 1, at 39.
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where are the contingent fee, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the use
of juries, and the absence of the requirement that the loser pay the
winner's litigation costs. 28 It is important to recognize, however,
that the United States differs in fundamental ways from some of the
other countries with which it is compared. American culture encourages an attitude less acceptant of authority, and more willing to challenge it, than almost any other country in the world. We also have
a very heterogeneous population, a wide variety of alternative value
systems and life styles, and extremely effective national systems of
communication. The population is highly mobile geographically, and
people's ties with neighborhoods and communities are weak. Moreover, American medicine is more complex, more heterogeneous, more
technologically developed, and more uneven in quality than that of
most comparably developed nations. Americans are also more likely
to have high expectations of their medical care, and probably have better access to lawyers. Thus, regardless of incentives for litigation inherent in the legal system, the conditions exist, particularly in urbanized areas, for a demanding and aggressive stance toward the medical
care system. In England, and perhaps in other countries, patients are
more docile and more accepting of whatever care they are given.29
If we had an adequate definition of "fault," we could determine
through investigation those cases in which injury resulted from negligence, and compare them with malpractice claims filed and awards
actually made. In the absence of such data some indirect indication
of whether too many claims are being made can be obtained through
surveys of lawyers and patients. The national Malpractice Commission surveyed lawyers who reported that they accepted approximately
one in eight claims among clients alleging malpractice. 0 About half
of the claims rejected by the lawyers were attributed to a lack of
liability. Before lawyers accepted a malpractice case they usually
required evidence that there was a reasonable possibility of malpractice, corroborated by a physician's opinion. Attorneys reported that
malpractice claims took more time to litigate than other negligence
work, and felt that they were turning down worthy claims because
the stakes were too small in relation to the required work.
The Temple University survey, referred to earlier, provides some
data from a consumer perspective. About two fifths of the 1,017
28. See Addison & Baylis, supra note 11, at Appendix 860; Welsh, supra note 11, at
Appendix 851-53.
29. See Mechanic, General Medical Practice in England and Wales: Its Organization and Future, 279 NEW ENG. J. MED. 680 (1968).
30. Dietz, Baird &Berul, supra note 21, at Appendix 99-101.
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respondents reported that either they, their spouses, or their dependents had suffered negative medical care experience within the past ten
years. 1 Such reports, of course, reflect only the perceptions of the
respondents, and provide no indication of the degree of malpractice
involved. But it is interesting that only thirty-seven respondents, or
eight percent of respondents reporting adverse experiences, indicated
that legal advice was considered. 2 Only fourteen respondents took
the matter up with a legal adviser, and six made a claim of malpractice. Of these, two later withdrew the claim without settlement, two
settled before trial, and two claims were still in process at the time
of the study.3 3 Thus it appears that very few of the grievances experienced lead to claims of negligence.
These two studies provide some indirect indication that the
number of claims made against physicians is not excessive, given the
extent to which patients perceive grievances and the extent to which
lawyers feel that claims of negligence have some merit. Moreover,
physicians working in the area of quality assurance have reported that
serious errors occur frequently and that a large proportion of hospital
records show major errors of omission or commission. 4 While only
some of these errors may result in serious adverse consequences for
the patient, any of them potentially can become an issue in a malpractice suit. Lawyers apparently feel that too much work is involved in
pursuing small claims, and in any case the costs of initiating litigation
would leave litigants with very little compensation. Indeed, one of
the major problems with the existing malpractice mechanism is the
very high administrative costs and the modest compensation left for
the litigant.3 5 A countervailing tendency, as suggested earlier, may
be the willingness of defendants to settle small suits quickly to avoid
their nuisance value, thus encouraging such claims. But it is likely
that the deterrent against small claims is the more powerful one.
The Problemof Defensive Medicine
One of the most confused areas involved in the malpractice
discussion concerns the allegations of defensive medicine. Physicians
31.
32.
33.
34.

Peterson, supra note 14, at Appendix 668-75.
Id. at Appendix 674-75.
Id. at Appendix 675.

MEnIcAL MALPRACIlCE REPORT 10.
35. Id. at 34; MEDIcAL MALRAcrlcE: A DIscussioN OF ALTERNATIVE CoMPENSATION AND QUAL1TY CONTROL SYSTEMS 17 (D. McDonald ed., Center for the Study of

Dem. Inst., 1971).
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have been vocal in their claims that the current malpractice situation
encourages them to engage in protective maneuvers that are expensive
but have relatively little value.36 Some state that the growing litigation induces them to use expensive, and sometimes risky, diagnostic
procedures to provide a record protecting them against liability,
should their behavior be at issue. To the extent that this occurs, it
unnecessarily inflates the costs of medical care. Other physicians
claim that the threat of litigation forces them into a defensive posture
when performing certain procedures or treating certain types of
injuries associated with high rates of litigation. In neither case is
there much hard evidence that defensive medicine significantly distorts the process of medical care.
Professor Hershey3 7 has tried to narrow the issue by defining
defensive medicine as a "deviation from what the physician believes
is sound practice and which is generally so regarded, induced by a
threat of liability."38 The key phrase here is "generally so regarded,"
the content of which is difficult to define. The core of the difficulty
in making sense of defensive medicine is the looseness and ambiguity
of medical standards. Presumably, defensive medicine occurs because
physicians feel that they are vulnerable to charges of negligence when
they fail to perform certain "unnecessary" tests or procedures such
as a skull x-ray following head trauma. Physicians would be vulnerable if they did not use such procedures because other physicians, competent in their specialty, may testify in malpractice cases that the performance of such procedures is essential for an appropriate assessment
of the patient's injury. Since physicians find it difficult to agree
about many aspects of diagnosis and treatment, the physician who
wishes to follow a less elaborate course of evaluation and treatment
may feel that he becomes vulnerable in the event of a claim against
him. Allegedly, this leads to the use of unnecessary procedures.
The purpose of standards is to bring the practice of each physician
to a minimal norm of acceptable practice. To the extent that a standard is established when there is considerable disagreement, the standard induces persons to practice differently from the way they would
in its absence. For those who agree with the standard, it is seen as
36. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 14; Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A
Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE LJ.939, 942; cf. Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: The Patient Versus the Physician, 6 TRIAL 10-27 (Feb./Mar. 1970) (discussing the
phenomenon of "negative" defensive medicine).
37. Hershey, The Defensive Practice of Medicine, Myth or Reality, 50 M.LBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 69 (1972).
38. Id. at 72.
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a definition of appropriate care; for those who see the standard as unrealistically high, conformity constitutes defensive medicine. In short,
arguments about defensive medicine inevitably reflect disagreements
and confusion about the practice of medicine itself.
If defensive medicine were as great a problem as many physicians
allege, one might expect certain regional variations in practice. For
example, one would suppose that in states or localities with high rates
of litigation, physicians in particular specialties would be much more
likely to use certain procedures in dealing with problematic cases than
would comparable physicians in low-litigation areas. Although there
are no large-scale studies of the question, one attempt to examine this
hypothesis found little evidence in its support, and suggested that
varying patterns of physician behavior are more likely to reflect local
norms and professional customs than the threat of litigation.3 9 Although it is no doubt true that some physicians order tests and procedures which they feel are unnecessary due to their fear that a lack
of such testing may lead to liability, the fact may be that these tests
and procedures should be done. The real issue is one of standards,
and in this area medicine is in a muddle. As a result, there are some
crucial issues of defensive medicine, but they are different from the
examples physicians usually cite.
Most of what is regarded as acceptable community practice is
based on judgments of medical process and not of outcome. Up to
now physicians have been trained in and have practiced within the
philosophy that Victor Fuchs has called the "technologic imperative," 40 namely, to the extent that a procedure can possibly be helpful to the patient, it should be done. These judgments are made
without serious consideration of their cost-effectiveness. Thus, certain practices that are based entirely on process judgments have
become normative, even in some cases where outcome studies raise
serious questions about the value of the procedure. Such norms
defining customary practice make it very difficult for a physician to
act solely on the basis of the research literature when this literature
is not consistent with custom.
Take, for example, the proliferation of intensive coronary care
units. While many physicians believe such units to be of value in saving lives, controlled trials fail to support this belief, at least for many
39. Project, supra note 36, at 959-60.
40. Fuchs, The Growing Demand for Medical Care, 279 NEw ENG. J. MED. 190
(1968).
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common cardiac incidents.41 But, given the climate of physician
opinion and customary practice, a medical group would feel extremely
vulnerable to malpractice claims if it departed from the use of coronary intensive care despite a belief that such care is unnecessary and
expensive. Also, when there is division in the medical community
concerning the value of a given procedure, a prudent physician is
likely to lean toward doing too much, since physicians involved in a
malpractice trial might be able to make a more convincing case to a
jury that the procedure should have been undertaken. Since the outcome of a contest between adversaries is in doubt when the medical
situation is unclear, the uncertainty is likely to reinforce the technologic imperative.
From a purely economic point of view, an important question
about the existing malpractice mechanism is the extent to which it
increases the total aggregate costs of medical practice by reinforcing
conservative decisions. As resources for medical care become more
limited relative to the increasing technological possibilities, medical
planners will have to develop means to establish priorities and to
determine which procedures truly enhance outcome. Whether they
will do so through government-promulgated standards, through local
standards developed by Professional Standards Review Organizations
(PSROs) or peer review groups, through consumer participation and
input, or some combination of all three, is not clear.42 What is
required, however, is a mechanism for legitimizing the standards
adopted so that professionals who conform to them can feel relatively
safe from negligence claims. Such standards, however, should also reflect cost-effective practice so that they do not further reinforce the
technologic imperative and the trend of increased medical care costs.
The Distributive Effects of Malpractice Litigation: Who Bears the
Risk?

The existing malpractice mechanism is an inequitable way of
compensating persons who suffer adverse consequences as a result of
negligence. It is inequitable because the awareness of medical error,
41. Mather, Pearson, Read, et al., Acute Myocardial Infarction: Home and Hospital
Treatment, 3 Brrr. MED. J.334 (1971). See also A. COCHaANE, EFFEcTiE4S Mn
EFFICIENcY: RANDOM REFLECIONS ON HEALTH SERvIcEs (1972).
42. One recent Note suggests that the due process clause requires that extensive
procedural safeguards be used in making any decision concerning allocation of scarce
medical resources. Note, Due Process in the Allocation of Scarce Lifesaving Medical
Resources, 84 YALE L.J. 1734 (1975). The procedural implications of such a position, if
accepted by the courts, would be considerable.
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the process of making a claim, and the amount of compensation paid
are not congruent with the adversities suffered by patients due to
negligence. Compensation tends to be much influenced by a variety
of social, psychological, and personal factors. Moreover, the true costs
involved in bringing and contesting claims are substantial, and only
a modest proportion of the money awarded constitutes actual compensation to the litigant. While no-fault insurance has been advocated
for the medical care area, such a proposal leaves unsolved the difficult
problem of distinguishing adverse outcomes resulting from negligence
from those that are the product of the natural development of the
patient's condition or that result unavoidably from high-risk therapy.
Many medical measures are dangerous, but are used to forestall even
greater adverse consequences related to an illness. Under the existing
tort system the adversary process reaches the necessary decisions as
to which incidents can be said to flow from physician error as opposed
to other causes. Under a no-fault system, other fact-finding and
decision-making techniques would be necessary.
While this paper does not deal with alternatives to malpractice,
such as arbitration or mediation, it is relevant to consider some underlying questions concerning alternative decision-making devices. Many
physicians, alarmed by increasing malpractice rates, advocate no-fault
insurance in the hope that such a mechanism would be less expensive
than the present system.4 3 While it certainly seems plausible that a
no-fault system would substantially reduce the middle-man costs
associated with extensive litigation, it does not follow that an effective no-fault system would be less expensive; indeed, it may be far
more costily. Unless the administration of such a system were quite
conservative, it might require that many more patients be compensated.
First, a no-fault system may generate more claims since the
inhibition against charging one's doctor with personal negligence may
be relieved by the no-fault definition. Second, it is conceivable that
under a no-fault system physicians may be more willing to inform
patients that they have been injured as a result of medical treatment,
and encourage them to seek compensation. Third, a no-fault system
might foster a moral obligation on the part of the medical care system
to compensate injured patients even when these patients have not
become aware of the cause of their problems or have failed to make
a claim because of ignorance, timidity, passivity, or whatever. Such
43. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 12, col. 1. But see J. O'CoNmNLT, supra note 1, at
73-74 (discussing unexpected costliness of no-fault medical coverage).
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an approach would be far more equitable than simply compensating
patients who are aggressive enough to pursue their claims; however,
it would also be very expensive.
The class of adverse events most difficult to deal with under a
no-fault system is that involving the use of high-risk techniques. A
certain degree of error, as noted earlier in this Article, is inevitable,
particularly in the use of complex medical procedures. Some have
argued that patients must assume such risks since they are an inevitable part of the treatment process. But the patient may be in the
poorest position to assume the risk of inevitable medical errors. As
a result of such errors the patient may suffer serious injury, prolonged
disability, and increased costs of medical care and dependence. It
would be reasonable to share the risks of such costs with others using
the same medical care system, but who luckily escape the inevitable
error. If a procedure results in one adverse event in a thousand, the
person who suffers that event is left with the total cost of the error.
It would seem fairer to distribute the cost among the patients who
benefit from the procedure. Though this would be a heavy burden
for a system replacing malpractice, it would not be an unreasonable
one. Many of the costs could be assumed by increased health insurance coverage and disability compensation.
A no-fault system would protect medical personnel and institutions against allegations that the inevitable errors result from their
negligence and incompetence. We do not know whether the existing
fault mechanism has a deterrent effect, but to the extent that it does,
a no-fault system might neutralize it. On the basis of the data that
I have studied on physician behavior, I am somewhat skeptical of the
theory that the threat of malpractice actions has a major deterrent
effect upon the technical work of physicians, although it may well
have a greater effect on the services that hospitals make available and
on their supervisory procedures. But the interpersonal aspect of
doctor-patient relationships is subtle, and moving to a no-fault system
may conceivably have more important effects on such relationships
than on technical performance.
In the traditional practice of fee-for-service medicine, the fact that
the patient pays a fee gives him some modest influence in the relationship. As competition among doctors for patients declines, this influence is less potent, but the fact that a fee is involved affects the
orientation of both patient and physician to some extent.44 Increas44. E. F~ImDSON, PROFESSION O1? MEDIcINE:
KNOWLEDGE (1970).

A

STmY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APLI=

Vol. 1975:1179]

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF MALPRACTICE

1195

ingly, as patients have moved from fee-for-service to prepaid contexts
they have suffered some erosion of their influence unless they are particularly aggressive. In prepaid settings, physicians seem more
oriented to the standards of their colleagues than to the demands of
patients. 45 Also, they are more likely to think of the typical patient
as "trivial" in the prepaid situation and take him somewhat for
granted. 46 Similarly, patients in prepaid contexts are more likely to
complain about the physician's lack of interest in them, his inflexibility, and the feeling that they are being treated like "charity
cases." 47 This may be a reaction particularly associated with patients
who grew up in a fee-for-service context and then changed to a prepaid plan, and it may be less of a problem for future generations who
are more receptive to bureaucratic treatment. Increasingly, however,
the patient has less leverage in his personal transactions with the
physician.
One of the remaining sources of power for the patient is his ability
to threaten or initiate malpractice litigation when he feels that his
interests have been abused. Although patients rarely do so, the
remote threat may to some extent control the bounds of physician
behavior. The use of a malpractice threat as a means of stating a
grievance may be a latent and undesirable aspect of the present system, but it may also be one of the last sources of the patient's power
in his relationship with the physician, the clinic, or the hospital.
Other means of increasing patients' involvement in their care have received a great deal of discussion, but few have been attempted on a
major scale. 48 Such techniques include complaint mechanisms, consumer participation in decision-making groups, regular opportunities
for changing health programs (as in dual choice and re-enrollment),
and the use of ombudsmen. While these are relatively uncertain substitutes for the power of the fee (and possibly also for the latent malpractice threat), they hold promise for the future.
The key point is that the malpractice problem is but a symptom
of more basic problems in the organization and provision of health
care and social services. An effective substitute for the existing system must be sensitive to the changing balance of power between
45. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 1; id. at 22, col. 2.
46. Mechanic, Patient Behavior and the Organizationof Medical Care, in INsTrrur
OF MEDICINE, ETHICS OF HEALTH (National Academy of Sciences 1973).

47. Tessler & Mechanic, Consumer Satisfaction with Prepaid Group Practice: A
ComparativeStudy, 16 J. HEALTH & Soc-AL BEHAVIOR 95 (1975).
48. See N.Y. Times, April 8, 1973, at 25, col. 1 (suggesting creation of federal
agency to monitor quality of patient care under Medicaid and Medicare).
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patients and physicians, and must contain adequate channels for
patients who feel wronged or harmed to state their grievances and to
receive fair consideration. It is the development of such an alternative system that will require our long-term efforts.

